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RELAXING THE ETHANOL MANDATE 
The severity of the drought of 2012 affecting corn production in the 
Mid-West has been compared to those experienced in the 1930s.  Yet 
paradoxically, we may have been better off in the 1930s when virtually 
all the corn crop was dedicated for food and feed use. Pre-drought 
expectations called for a 14.65 billion bushel (BB) harvest with 5.11 BB 
going for ethanol production, 6.72 BB for domestic food and feed and 
the remainder for exports (Figure 1).  The USDA’s August 10, 2012 
estimate calls for a realized corn harvest of only 10.8 BB.  If ethanol 
consumption is unaffected, domestic food and feed consumption 
would drop from 6.72 BB to 4.2 BB—a 37% reduction. Domestic food 
and feed uses will absorb the brunt of the shortfall unless ethanol 
production is substantially reduced.  The economic consequences are 
predictable:  since mid-June corn prices are up 55%, ethanol prices are 
up 19%, and U.S. food prices are expected to rise between 3 and 4% 
next year. The effects of rising food prices in developing countries will 
be particularly severe. 
 
Relaxing the mandate for 2013 would allow corn destined for ethanol 
production to be diverted instead for food and feed, thereby sharing 
the shortfall.  A no brainer?  Not to some respected academics that 
have set forth arguments that a waiver would make no difference and 
if it were to make a difference, it would be unfair. Let’s see where they 
are coming from and why we think they’ve gone wrong. 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Ethanol production could claim 
47% of the U.S. corn harvest 
 
The EPA can relax the ethanol 
mandate, allowing corn destined 
for ethanol production to be 
used for food and feed 
 
Opponents argue incorrectly that 
a waiver would be irrelevant 
 
The possibility of a sub-par 
harvest in 2013 argues strongly 
for a waiver now 
2 
ARGUMENTS 1 & 2: 
A WAIVER WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE 
1. A waiver of the ethanol mandate for 2013 would 
have no effect for two reasons:   
 Despite the recent increase in ethanol prices, 
ethanol is likely to remain the cheapest blend 
stock to raise the octane of both conventional 
and reformulated gasoline.   
 Even if ethanol became so expensive that it was 
no longer the preferred octane booster, refiners 
have very limited flexibility to replace it with 
other non-ethanol blends.  
2. The existing regulatory apparatus could accommo-
date a substantial ethanol reduction with no need 
for a waiver. Even if gasoline blenders found it both 
economically and technically desirable to reduce 
ethanol consumption, a reduction of 2.6 billion gal-
lons (potentially freeing up almost 1 BB of corn) 
could be achieved without a waiver by using excess 
permits (called RINs) already present in the existing 
regulatory apparatus.  
 
ARGUMENTS 3 & 4: 
EVEN IF IT MADE A DIFFERENCE,  
IT WOULDN’T BE FAIR  
3. The cause of the economic harm is the drought, not 
the ethanol mandates. The EPA cannot change the 
magnitude of the loss by granting waivers.  At best, 
it can only redistribute that loss among the affected 
parties—ethanol producers, corn farmers, livestock 
producers, and food consumers.  
4. Even if a waiver redistributed the losses, it would 
not be “fair” to ethanol producers.  After all, ethanol 
plants were built in the expectation of a guaranteed 
market by the Energy Independence and Security 
Act (EISA) of 2007.  
 
REBUTTAL 
Does it then follow that the EPA should reject the 
waiver request? We believe not, for two reasons.   
First, there is a substantial probability that because of 
events yet to unfold, a waiver now could avoid an even 
more severe economic disruption in 2013.  
 
Second, we reject Arguments 3 and 4 above.  The 
EPA’s decision is much more than a question of redis-
tributing the gains and losses to various interest 
groups engaged in a zero-sum game.  As discussed 
later, a waiver could potentially avoid substantial  
losses in 2013 that could easily trump the rationale of 
fairness to ethanol producers. 
 
There is a significant probability on the order of say .3 
or .4 that a waiver would be effective and could have 
large social benefits.  Under what conditions might 
this happen? 
 
AN ANEMIC HARVEST IN 2013? 
Suppose the drought in 2012 lingers into the 2013 
crop year, resulting in another year with below  
average corn yields.  A look at historical weather 
patterns suggests that severe drought years are not 
generally followed by a full rebound to pre-drought 
levels in the following year. 
 
Taking USDA data on corn yields per planted acre 
going back to 1926 and excluding the current year, 
one finds that there were 12 years when the yield 
per acre declined from the previous year by more 
than 15%.  The question is whether yields per acre 
rebounded in the subsequent year to at least match 
the pre-drought yield per acre. In 8 of the 12 drought 
years, yields failed to fully rebound to previous levels 
leaving yields on average 6% below their pre-drought 
levels. 
 
A major argument in support of a 2013 waiver has 
less to do with the current crop shortfall and more to 
do with allowing for flexibility in dealing with a po-
tential anemic rebound in next year’s corn harvest. A 
rising corn ethanol mandate for 2014 of 14.4 billion 
gallons, coupled with an anemic rebound of corn 
supplies, is a prescription for even higher corn  
prices.  
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Another major uncertainty favoring a waiver is future 
crude oil prices in the face of a weakening world econo-
my.  Some combination of sharply higher ethanol prices 
coupled with lower crude oil costs could make ethanol 
no longer the most cost-effective octane enhancer.  How-
ever, this substitution would only occur if the mandate 
were waived.  Absent a waiver, ethanol plants will simply 
bid up the price of corn and gasoline blenders will have 
little choice but to pay the higher ethanol prices. 
 
OIL PRICE UNCERTAINTY ARGUES FOR A WAIVER 
With a 2013 waiver in place, refiners would have time to 
implement the planning to produce higher octane gaso-
line with lower ethanol content by summer 2013.  For 
example, if by summer 2013, corn harvest forecasts 
show only a partial rebound and ethanol is no longer the 
cost-effective octane enhancer, refiners could begin pro-
ducing higher octane gasoline blends with lower ethanol 
content.  Previous experience in refinery economics tells 
us that refiners have surprising flexibility to alter the 
product mix of the refinery, and specifically the  
characteristics of the gasoline blend pool. 
 
Refiners with access to water can choose among a wide 
variety of crude oil types and all can vary the intensity 
with which they use the downstream processing units in 
the refineries. Because of the marked decline in demand 
for gasoline, refiners frequently find themselves with 
spare capacity in the reforming and alkylation units—
key processing units for producing higher octane gaso-
line. With a waiver in place by January 2013, most  refin-
eries should have no difficulty producing a higher octane 
gasoline pool by summer 2013.  Conversely, with no 
waiver in place, refiners would have no reason to begin 
the contingency planning and implementation tasks  
necessary to produce such blends; they would remain 
locked into the status quo. Without a waiver, refiners 
would have no reason to develop ethanol substitutes. 
 
With an anemic crop rebound and no waiver, the existing 
surplus of 2.6 billion gallons of RINs will probably be 
depleted before completion of the 2013 harvest.  Fur-
thermore, having used up the 2.6 billion gallon RIN cush-
ion, blenders would then be facing the gargantuan task of 
meeting 2014 requirements of 14.4 billion gallons of  
ethanol.  Conversely, by granting a waiver for 2013, the 
existing 2.6 billion gallon cushion would presumably be 
available for use in the year 2014.     
 
A WAIVER:  
ZERO DOWNSIDE AND  
POSITIVE POSSIBLE UPSIDE 
If the weather cooperates with a reasonable crop re-
bound in 2013 and ethanol remains the most cost-
effective octane enhancer, what then would be the 
downside of granting a waiver? Gasoline blenders will 
continue to blend ethanol up to the limits. The effects 
of a waiver would be benign. It would impose neither 
harm nor help. 
 
But what if weather conditions in 2013 conspire 
against us and/or oil prices decrease? In this case, a 
waiver in January 2013 would set in motion supply 
planning for that contingency. By summer 2013, refin-
ers would be fully capable of supplying higher octane 
gasoline with lower ethanol content if ethanol was no 
longer the most cost-effective octane enhancer. Even 
higher corn prices could be avoided. This would sure-
ly mitigate the conflict between food and fuel which is 
particularly acute in developing countries. It is often 
forgotten that the U.S. is a significant corn exporter; 
price movements here have international ramifica-
tions. 
 
HOW ABOUT FAIRNESS? 
This brings us back to Arguments 3 and 4 above. Is it 
true that even if waivers made a difference that the 
effects would be bad? Does it follow that the cause of 
the harm would be the anemic harvest rebound—not 
the mandates? If we can take actions now to mitigate 
the effects of an anemic crop yield in 2013, then the 
argument that the cause of the economic harm is the 
drought and it’s just a matter of who the winners and 
losers are no longer follows (see Tyner et al). 
 
To the contrary, by failing to build in contingency op-
tions today, the EPA would be culpable.  No longer is 
the issue one of simply redistributing a fixed pool of 
money among the various interest groups.  The issue 
becomes avoiding future losses with real world costs.  
For this reason, the EPA’s decision is particularly im-
portant. 
 
As for Argument 4, we do not believe that supporters 
of the 2007 EISA ever intended to guarantee a market 
for ethanol producers to the absolute disregard of the 
nation’s and world’s food and feed consumers.  In-
deed, this is why Congress added Section 211(0)(7)
(A) to EISA and empowered the EPA to modify the 
mandates.  Issues of fairness to ethanol producers are 
of a second order of importance.   
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A waiver could avoid an even more 
severe economic disruption in 2013. 
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FOOD VS. FUEL: 
AN UNCOMFORTABLE TRADE-OFF 
Particularly, in many developing countries (such as 
Kenya, Pakistan and Cameroon) the food expenditures 
of the average citizen are at least 40% or more of their 
income. When cereal grain prices jump by 67.4%, as 
they did in 2010, the poor simply eat less. They have no 
other cheaper food to substitute. Indeed, citing World 
Bank data, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations reports rising food prices had plunged 
nearly 70 million people into extreme poverty in 2010-
2011. Moreover, UNICEF unmistakably points out that 
“malnutrition is the underlying cause of more than 1/3 of 
all childhood deaths. Prices for basic food like rice, maize 
(corn), wheat, cooking oil, sugar and salt are rising 
sharply, forcing millions of the world’s poorest children 
into severe malnourishment and starvation.” 
 
As the primary exporter of corn, our actions affect 
world food prices. We are only now beginning to see the 
effects on food prices resulting from the 2012 drought 
and the ethanol mandates. Even though U.S. consumers 
only spend 11.4% of their income on food, we cannot 
ignore the effects of our actions on others. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the magnitude of the existing corn harvest 
shortfall coupled with the large ethanol mandates, poli-
cy makers face extreme uncertainties looking into the 
future with potentially large economic ramifications.  
Precisely, because neither the economic modelers nor 
the decision makers can foretell all of the factors affect-
ing corn harvests and ethanol use in 2013, a waiver is a 
wise course of action.  To be sure, a waiver may have no 
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effect and turn out to be irrelevant. Even so, we argue 
that it has no downside.  But if an anemic harvest re-
bound occurs in 2013, a waiver could avoid substan-
tial economic dislocations in 2013 and beyond.   
Regulators should opt for flexibility. 
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